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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction to this Court is Section 78A4-103(2)( e), U.C.A.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did the lower court err in failing to make sufficiently detailed findings to
allow the Appellate court the opportunity to adequately review the trial court's
vj

decision? In determining a defendant's Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea, the
Court needs to assess the credibility of the evidence and make detailed findings on
all relevant facts. Rule 12 (c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. These
facts must be sufficiently detailed to allow the Appellate court the opportunity to
adequately review the trial court's decision. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882
(Utah App. 1990). On Appeal, the trial court's denial of a Motion to Withdraw a
Guilty Plea will not be disturbed "unless it clearly appears that the trial court
abused its discretion." State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App.
1991 ). This lack of adequate findings was brought to the lower court's attention in

~

a Motion for Clarification filed on May 11, 2015 (R. 352-53 ).
2. Did the lower court err in failing to find prosecutorial misconduct when
the undisputed facts reveal that the deputy district attorney informed Defendant
and his counsel that the complainant had informed the deputy assistant attorney
1
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that she did not want the defendant to serve time in prison when, in fact, she
adamantly denied such a statement and emphasized to Defendant's investigator
that she always wished him to go to prison from the time of the commission of the
offense. Did the lower court err in failing to set aside the guilty plea and
reinstating the preliminary hearing that had been waived by Defendant on the basis
of the representation by the deputy county attorney? A trial court's handling of
claimed prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. King, 248 P.3d 984 (Utah App. 2010); State v. Bragg, 317 P.3d
452 (Utah App. 2013). This argument was brought to the Court's attention in
Defendant's "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea" filed
April 11, 2015 (R. 306-319).
3. Did the lower court err in failing to allow Defendant to withdraw his
guilty plea under Section 77-13-6(2)(a), U.C.A. since the uncontroverted record
shows that the plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made? The evidence is
uncontroverted that the deputy county attorney represented to the defendant, his
counsel, and to the court that the complaint had originally desired that Defendant
not serve any time in the state penitentiary. Furthermore, he represented that her
position had not changed and that the state would recommend no prison time
unless the complaining witness did not agree. The uncontroverted evidence
produced by Defendant showed that the complaining witness desired Defendant to

2
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go to prison at all times and that the claim made by the deputy county attorney was
a misrepresentation of her position which induced the defendant to enter his plea of
guilty. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under
~

an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for
findings of fact and reviewing questions of law for correctness. State v. Person,
140 P.3d 584 (Utah App. 2006); State v. Walker, 308 P.3d 573 (Utah App. 2013).
This issue was preserved in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea filed April 11, 2015 (R. 306-319).

~

PERTINENT UTAH STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are relevant to this Appeal: Rule 11, Utah
Rules Crim. Proc.; Rule 12, Utah Rules Crim. Proc.; Section 77-13-6(2)(a),
U.C.A.; Amendment 5 to the U.S. Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While there were many procedural events occurring in this litigation, very
few are relevant to this Appeal and are as follows:
On April 18, 2013 an Information was filed against the defendant by Deputy
District Attorney Thaddeus May alleging that Defendant engaged in sexual
intercourse with another person without the complainant's consent in violation of
Section 76-5-402, U.C.A., a first degree felony. (R.1-3).
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On June 6, 2013 the preliminary hearing was set before the Honorable
Robert Faust. Defendant waived the preliminary hearing. (R. 41 ).
Over the course of the next eighteen months Defendant's attorneys filed
various motions and requests including a request to tum over all DNA and clothing

~

for independent examination, a motion to suppress some of the statements made by
Defendant to the arresting officer on the basis that the defendant had not been
properly Mirandized, and a motion to reopen the preliminary hearing to allow the
testimony of two previously unknown witnesses. All of these motions and
hearings were scheduled to be heard on January 5, 2015. (R. 144).
On January 5, 2015 at the hearing scheduled for the various motions, a plea
bargain was reached between Defendant and Deputy District Attorney Thaddeus
May. Mr. May agreed to reduce the offense from a first-degree felony to a seconddegree felony. In addition, the plea bargain agreement states: "In exchange for the
defendant's plea of guilty the prosecutor agrees that in the event the complainant
does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecution seeking a prison commitment
that the prosecutor will recommend probation and no prison." (R. 150).
The prosecutor made various statements to the court concerning the plea
agreement that will be extensively discussed infra. The "Minutes Change of Plea
Notice" dated January 5, 2015 states the following:
Counsel represents to the Court that a resolution has been reached.
The State agrees that they will not recommend a prison sentence if the
4
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complainant is not requesting prison. The State also represents to the Court
that the complainant is aware of the resolution and in agreement. (R. 154).
The Judge signed the Minute Entry. (R. 155).
On January 5, 2015 Deputy District Attorney Thaddeus May filed an
"Amended Information" recharging Defendant with the violation of 76-5-404
U.C.A., a second degree felony. (R. 158-59).
On February 25, 2015 App sent its recommendations to the court concerning
the recommended sentence of Defendant. The report stated, "It is respectfully
VJP

recommended by Adult Probation and Parole, Court Services Unit, that Defendant
be committed to the Utah State Prison for the term as prescribed by law." (R. 162).
The report further states:
Complainant M.C. is affirmatively recommending the Defendant be
sentenced to prison for a minimum of two years, as she herself has had to
deal with the consequences of the defendant's actions for the past three
years, and quite possibly for the rest of her life. She feels the defendant
should have to similarly be held accountable and suffer from the
consequences of his own actions, as she has had to do for the past three
years."
(R. 164).

In view of the unexpected nature of the App report, defense counsel
requested a continuation for the sentencing hearing. (R. 198-202). On March 2,
2015 a hearing was held before the district court. This was the date originally
~

scheduled for sentencing. The Court granted the defense Motion for Continuance
to March 30, 2015 based upon the prior motion filed by defendant. The Minutes
5
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state, "the complainant in this matter can address the court today and will not have
to Appear at the next hearing." (R. 228-29). The complainant gave a short
statement to the court requesting that the defendant be sent to prison. A portion of
her statement was as follows:
As far as what I believe should be done to you, I'm asking the judge
to sentence you to two-a-half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt
me. A prison I've been in, waiting for this to be over. I also want you to be
on the sexual offender list. (Tr. March 2, 2015, p. 12).
On March 19, 2015 the state filed a "Substitution of Counsel of Record for
the State" replacing Deputy District Attorney Thaddeus May with Aaron W. Flater.

(R. 230).
On March 26, 2015 Defendant filed a "Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty
Plea and Stay Sentencing Proceedings." The defendant requested thirty days to
prepare and file a memorandum of law relating to the statement of the alleged
complainant requesting a prison sentence in complete contradiction to the prior
statements of the deputy district attorney. (R. 233-35).
On March 30, 2015 a hearing was held before the trial court and with the
new prosecutor Aaron Flater. Under the State's objection, the court allowed the
defendant to file a Memorandum in Support of the Motion by April I 0 th , the State
to file a response by April 24 1\ and the matter to be set for oral argument on April

2?1h. (R. 239).

6
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~

On April 8, 2015 attorney Craig S. Cook entered his Appearance as cocounsel on behalf of defendant Robert Magness. (R. 241 ).
On April 10, 2015 the Affidavit of Larry Long (R. 244-55), the Affidavit of
Shawn Kane, (R. 256-67) and the Affidavit of Robert Morgan Magness (R. 26873) were filed with the court. In addition, a Memorandum in Support of the
Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea was filed (R. 306-19) together with a Motion
to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (R. 323).
A hearing was held on April 27, 2015 on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw
Guilty Plea. The state did not file its opposition memorandum until April 27,
2015, the day of the hearing (R. 334-35) rather than the date set by the judge of
April 24 th •
At the hearing, counsel for the defendant argued that the guilty plea should
be set aside on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct and involuntary entry of the
guilty plea. The deputy district attorney rejected these contentions and argued that
the guilty plea should stand. The court took the matter under advisement and,
depending on the decision, set sentencing or scheduling for a new trial for May 11,
2015. (R. 336-38).
On May 6, 2015 the lower court issued its "Ruling and Order." The court
ruled that there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in that "there is no
evidence that these representations were contrary to what the prosecutor knew to

7
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be true." In addition, the court ruled that Defendant did not meet his burden under
Section 77-13-6(2)(A) to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court denied
Defendant's Amended Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate
Preliminary Hearing and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions. The court set
sentencing for May 11, 2015. (R. 339-42).
On May 11, 2015 Defendant filed his "Motion to Clarify the Ruling and
Order of Defendant's Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary
Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests." Defendant argued
that the court failed to meet its obligation in making specific findings of fact as
required by the Appellate courts. (R. 348-51 ).
On May 11, 2015 Defendant was sentenced by the lower court to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison. (R. 356-57).
On May 17, 2015 the Notice of Appeal was filed. (R. 358-59).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The prior section lists the chronology of events that occurred in this matter
which are contained in the record of the District Court. However, the factual basis
for this Appeal is only partially contained in one transcript before the lower court
during the time of the entry of the guilty plea. All other relevant facts are
contained solely in the affidavits of attorney Larry Long (R. 244-55), defendant

8
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Robert Morgan Magness (R. 268-74)), Shawn Kane and the transcription of a
telephone conversation between investigator Shawn Kane and M.C., the
complainant of the case. (R. 256-267) This last affidavit and transcript is contained
14)

in the Appendix to this Brief.
THE STATE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY CONTRADICTORY
AFFIDAVITS, TRANSCRIPTS, OR LIVE TESTIMONY IN OPPOSITION TO
THESE AFFIDAVITS AND TELEPHONE TRANSCRIPT. Thus, for the purpose
of this Appeal, it must be assumed that the factual events and conversations that
occurred in these affidavits and telephone transcript are true and correct and must
be dealt with as such when reviewing the legal arguments made in this matter.
The first significant event relating to this Appeal occurred on June 6, 2013the date and time set for the preliminary hearing. Larry Long testified in his

~

affidavit that he had determined that there was a legitimate defense as to whether
the complainant had consented to sexual intercourse or whether defendant believed
she had consented in light of their impaired and intoxicated conditions at the time
the officers arrived at the residence. (Long Affidavit, ,I 6,7)(R. 245).
Long further testified that it was his intention at the preliminary hearing to
thoroughly probe the complainant as to her memory and to her consumption of
alcohol during the evening and to cross examine her as to her sexual relations with
defendant's son prior to his going to work that morning. Long also stated he

9
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intended to question the complainant's girlfriend as to her recollection of all events
and the state of mind of the complainant during the time line that the rape allegedly
occurred. (Long Affidavit, 1 8)(R. 246).
Mr. Long stated that on the date of the preliminary hearing he observed
Thad May, the deputy district attorney assigned to the case, consulting with the
plaintiff and a female companion. "Mr. May then left the two females and
approached me to discuss the case. He specifically told me that the complainant
informed him that she did not want the defendant to go to prison." (Long
Affidavit, 119, 1O)(R. 246).
Mr. Long then related that based upon his lengthy legal experience, this was
a significant event because when an alleged complainant does not request prison
time, the prosecuting attorney, the AP&P and the court look much more favorably
to a reduced punishment or parole. (Long Affidavit, 1111, 12)(R. 246-47).
Mr. Long then stated in his affidavit:
Upon hearing this revelation that the complainant did not seek a
prison term against defendant, I completely abandoned my desire for a
preliminary hearing. My experience has taught me that if a complainant is
favorable to my client, then it is very harmful for me to put that witness on
the stand and cross examine her as to very personal and sensitive issues.
Such cross-examination will almost certainly result in hostility toward the
defendant that will again result in greater punishment. (Long Affidavit, 1
14)(R. 24 7).
Long testified that he discussed this new information with his client and
advised him that the preliminary hearing should be waived. The defendant agreed
10
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and Mr. Long informed the court that they would waive the preliminary hearing in
the matter. (Long Affidavit ,I l S)(R. 248).
The Affidavit of Robert Morgan Magness substantiates Mr. Long's
""

statements. Mr. Magness stated that upon the day of the preliminary hearing he
was told by Mr. Long that it would be necessary to thoroughly cross examine the
complainant and her girlfriend as to all facts and circumstances that night including
their alcohol consumption and sexual acts. (Magness Affidavit, ,I S)(R. 269).
Defendant Magness stated in his Affidavit:
While waiting in the vestibule I witnessed Mr. Thad May, the deputy
district attorney, consulting with the complainant and her girlfriend. He then
joined me and Mr. Long. Mr. May informed us that the complainant did not
want me to go to prison. He said that it may now be possible to enter into a
plea bargain where I might not go to prison. I was very happy to hear this
news. Mr. Long then stated that he advised me that we should waive the
preliminary hearing because to proceed would greatly alienate the
complainant and may make her hostile or antagonistic toward me when she
was asked questions about drinking and sex. I agreed that we should waive
the preliminary hearing because of this new information. (Magness
Affidavit, ,I 6)(R. 289-90).
Private investigator Shawn Kane was hired by the defendant to assist in the
defense of this matter. As such, he contacted the complainant on January 10, 2014
regarding solely what had occurred on the night of the incident. (Shawn Kane
Affidavit, ,I,I 3, 4, 5)(R. 257). Mr. Kane then related the following concerning the
preliminary hearing that she attended:
She informed me that in her mind the defendant had already entered a
guilty plea based upon her conversations with the prosecutor at the hearing
11
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she last attended. She stated that the prosecutor told her that she would not
need to testify unless she wanted to go to the defendant's sentencing hearing
to say something about how he should be punished. (Shawn Kane Affidavit,
16)(R. 258).
On March 1, 2015 Mr. Kane again contacted the complainant at the same
phone number previously used. He recorded the conversation and attached a
transcript that he certified to be accurate as to their conversation. (Kane Affidavit,

1 9)(R. 258). This transcript is attached as an Addendum to this Brief.
In the transcript the following dialogue occurred:
MR.KANE:

And there was a question, Jennifer Murray [App agent]
asked you a question, and then the attorney had a
question. I say, "the attorney" sorry, Larry Long had a
question about prison. And so, initially, and I explained
the kind of question that then-initially, when this whole
thing started and you had spoken with the district
attorney and the prosecutor-that would be Thad Mayat a hearing they believe you said that you did not want
Robert to go to prison.

M.C.:

No, I didn't say that.

MR.KANE:

Okay.

M.C.:

I didn't say that I did not want him to go to prison. I
said, well it's important to me that he's on the sexual
offender list. That was like-I said that I wanted him to
serve prison time, but the most important thing to me was
that I wanted him to go on the sexual offender list.
(March 1 Tr. pp. 4-5)(R. 263-64 ).

Mr. Kane continued the interview with the following question:
MR.KANE:

At, at the time, did you want, when you talked to him,
did you want him to go to prison too?
12
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~

M.C.:

Yes, I felt like he deserved some time in prison.

MR. KANE:

Okay. All right. And that-I just wanted to double
check, because there was some confusion from the
attorney's side, and not your attorneys but Larry Long
and the paperwork that came in, in making sure that he
had the correct information, that when you talked to Thad
May-

M.C.:

Yeah

MR.KANE:

Did you say you wanted Robert to go to prison? And
then, when you talked to Jennifer Murray did you also
tell her you wanted him to go to prison too?

M.C.:
5(R. 264).

Yes-I said essentially the same thing to her. Id. at p.

After the preliminary hearing, no immediate offer for a plea bargain was
made by Mr. May. The defense team continued to file various motions in
preparation of the trial. (Long Affidavit, ,I 17)(R. 248).
Mr. Long verified the hiring of Shawn Kane to assist them in preparation of
the defense. He also verified the conversation of January 10, 2014 that Mr. Kane
had with the complainant including her belief that the defendant had already plead
guilty based on her conversation with Thad May during the preliminary hearing.
i.::P

Finally, "he reported to me that the plaintiff expressed no anger or vindictiveness
against defendant in her conversation but did not mention, one way or the other,
what punishment he should receive." (Larry Long Affidavit, ,I l 8)(R. 248-49).

13
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During the remainder of 2014 the defense team filed various motions and
requests for discovery that were all opposed by the state. (Larry Long Affidavit, 11
21-23)(R. 250). Mr. Long stated, "During this period of time it was the intent of
myself and Mr. Parsons [co-counsel] to continue to provide a vigorous defense in
preparation of a trial should the need occur. However, based upon the
representation of Mr. May as to the attitude of the complainant, we were hopeful
that a settlement could be reached. (Larry Long Affidavit, ,r 24 )(R. 250).
On January 5, 2015 a hearing was scheduled as to all the prior motions filed
by the defense team. Defendant's attorneys were prepared to argue all the various
matters to protect the constitutional rights of their client. However, Mr. May
Approached Mr. Long and Mr. Parsons and proposed that a plea agreement be
reached in which the first degree felony would be reduced to a second degree
felony-forcible sexual abuse-and that the prosecutor would recommend no
prison sentence be served by the defendant provided that the complainant did not
affirmatively insist upon the prosecution seeking a prison commitment. (Larry
Long Affidavit, ,r 26)(250-51 ).
Mr. Long stated in his affidavit the reason why this offer seemed beneficial
to his client:
At this time I realized that we were giving up all the previous defenses
and discovery requests that had been made during the last year but felt that
the plea bargain was in the best interest of my client especially believing that
the complainant would not seek a prison term against my client thereby
14
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resulting in a favorable recommendation by the prosecutor and App to this
Court at the time of sentencing. Because probation with jail time was an
option to a second degree offense but not a first degree offense, I felt there
would be a good chance for my client to avoid a five year or so prison
sentence under either a first or second. (Larry Long Affidavit, ,r 28)(R.
251).
At the hearing the defendant executed the "Statement of Defendant in
Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel" referred to in the prior section
of this Brief. The bottom of page 4 of the statement reads as follows:
All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any,
are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: in
exchange for the defendant's plea of guilty the prosecution agrees that in the
event the victim does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecutor seeking a
prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend probation and no
prison. (R. 150).
During a dialogue between the trial Court and counsel the following
conversation occurred:
THE COURT:

All right, and is this done with the alleged victim's-

MR.MAY:

Correct. She's been contacted twice by the state since
the offers, since we've discussed resolving the case, she's
made no response to my attempts to get response, her
phone did not work. When we met initially during the
intake, her very first impression of the case was, actually,
she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly
amenable to resolving the case. And I had
(unintelligible) prior. Since that time, she has not
communicated with the state at all although we made
multiple attempts to contact her.

MR. PARSONS: And I think the factual statement will clarify that to some
degree, Your Honor, I would represent that15
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MR.MAY:

Her wishes are not being cut out of this resolution

MR. PARSONS: I would represent that the victim and the perpetrator in
this case were so drunk that neither of them knew what
was going on in the context. (pp. 4-5, Tr. of Jan. 5,
2015).
At the end of the proceeding, the following statements were made:
MR. PARSONS: As it is anticipated, Your Honor, that in exchange for this
guilty plea, that is Mr.-the prosecution has heretofore
indicated to the Court that unless the victim affirmatively
requests a commitment of prison for the defendant's
behavior, that the prosecutor in prosecution in this matter
will recommend no prison time and will recommend
probation of some form.
MR. MAY:

That's correct Your Honor. Our recommendation is
simply that we would honor the victim's wishes. If the
victim were asking for a prison sentence, we're not
bound to not recommend prison and the victim is not
seeking a prison sentence. That's not her request. That
recommendation, however, does not bind the state in any
way as to jail, that would be speaking in any event
regardless of the recommendation. (Id. at pp. 10-11 ).

In the Minute Entry signed by the Court the following language is contained.
"Counsel represents to the Court that a resolution has been reached. The State
agrees that they will not recommend a prison sentence if the victim is not
requesting prison. The State also represents to the Court that the victim is aware of
the resolution and in agreement." (R. 154).
Defendant Robert Morgan Magness recited his memory of the events of
January 5, 2015 in his affidavit. He stated:
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

While waiting for the court to start, I witnessed Mr. Long, Mr.
Parsons, and Mr. May conferring for quite a long time. Mr. Long and Mr.
Parsons then came to me and informed me that Mr. May had agreed to
reduce the charge to forcible sexual abuse which was a second degree felony
and not a first. They also said it would be likely I would not face any prison
time because Mr. May had expressly confirmed with Mr. Long and Mr.
Parsons that the complainant in this case did not want me to go to prison. I
figured she knew that both of us shouldn't have been so drunk that morning
and that it was an unfortunate incident that should be forgiven if I spent
some time in jail. (Robert Magness Affidavit, ,I 8)(R. 270-71 ).
Mr. Magness then continues as to the recommendation of his attorneys:
They told me that the prosecuting attorney would recommend that I
not go to prison unless the complainant insisted I go to prison. However, my
attorneys thought it was very improbable that this would hAppen in light of
Mr. May's strong assurance that she did not want me to serve time in prison.
I was also told by Mr. Long and Mr. Parsons that I would be giving up all of
my constitutional rights to contest this charge against me. They believed,
however, that there was a very good likelihood that while I may have to
serve time in the county jail, I would not have to serve time in the State
Prison based upon the circumstances of the night, my prior favorable record,
and the positive attitude of the complainant. I agreed that I would waive my
right to a trial and plead guilty. (Robert Magness Affidavit, 19)(R. 271 ).
Finally Defendant stated:
During the hearing with the court I again heard Mr. May state that the
complainant did not want a prison term for me even though he had been
unable to contact her for several months. Based upon his statement I felt
very good about my decision to enter into a guilty plea in this case. (Robert
Magness Affidavit, ,I l0)(R. 271-272).
The remaining relevant facts are undisputed. The subsequent App report
recommended a term of prison incarceration that included a statement of the
complainant that she wished defendant to go to prison for at least two to three
years to compensate for the time that she had suffered. On March 2, 2015 the
17
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complainant made a similar statement in open court as to her feelings and
recommendations as to defendant's sentence.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The defendant produced the only evidence relating to the complainant's
state of mind as to whether or not she desired the defendant to be incarcerated in
prison and the time period of her desire. The state offered no proof whatsoever
except as to the statements made by the deputy district attorney in the guilty plea
proceeding. The court made only several brief factual references in its opinion.
The unrefuted evidence of the defendant, however, directly contradicts these
references. Thus, the court failed to make the necessary findings required by this
Court to resolve a factual dispute in a motion hearing. The matter should be
remanded for further findings or, in the alternative, for a full evidentiary hearing as
to circumstances relating to the representation by the deputy district attorney that
the complainant did not wish defendant to be incarcerated in the state prison.
2. Prosecutors are not equivalent to the average advocate for a litigant.
Instead, they represent the state and the people of that state and must seek justice
over victory. In this case, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the deputy
district attorney misrepresented the state of mind of the complainant at two critical
times in this prosecution. First, at the very moment when Defendant was preparing
to cross-examine the complainant and her girlfriend as to the facts and
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circumstances occurring on the morning of the incident. The prosecutor's
misrepresentation resulted in an informed decision by defense counsel to waive the
preliminary hearing and the possibility of impeaching the complaining witness or
~

gathering critical information for trial.
Secondly, at the time when various motions seeking discovery and other
relief were to be heard, the deputy district attorney suddenly made an offer to
reduce the charges and to agree not to recommend prison if the complainant
agreed. This offer stopped all of the proceedings and all of the various defenses
that were to be argued and, at the same time, eliminated the burden of a jury trial.
This prosecutorial misconduct, therefore, goes beyond the mere setting aside
of a guilty plea but requires the resetting of the entire defense including the
preliminary hearing and all other matters that would have occurred but for this

~

material misrepresentation.
3. Utah law is very specific as to when a guilty plea can be withdrawn. The
lower court refused to recognize the conflict in testimony as to the state of mind of
the complaining witness contained in the telephonic transcript. The court found no
conflict with the statement made by the deputy district attorney in open court and
therefore refused to deal with any claim pursuant to the statute. The lower court
erred in its decision since the representation of the complainant's state of mind in
conjunction with the recommendation by the prosecutor for no prison time was,
19
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according to the uncontroverted affidavits of the defense counsel, the only reason
that the plea agreement was accepted. Since the agreement was made on a
misrepresentation and a promise that was essentially illusionary, the plea should be
vacated in accordance with Utah law.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT TO ADDRESS THE
UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY DEFENDANT
The factual basis underlying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Guilty
Plea is contained entirely in the affidavits of Mr. Long, defendant Magness, Mr.
Kane, and the telephone transcript of the conversation with the complainant. Aside
from the brief statements made to the court on January 5, 2015, there is no other
evidence to be considered.
A review of the court's decision of May 6, 2015, however, makes no attempt
to address these undisputed factual statements. It is clear from reading the
transcript of the telephone conversation with the complainant that she, at no time,
ever informed the deputy district attorney that she did not want Defendant to go to
prison. Her desires were consistent throughout the entire case from the time she
spoke to the App agent, her telephone conversation with Mr. Kane, and her
statements to the court. Nonetheless, the court stated, "Nor has the prosecutor
20
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intentionally made knowing use of false evidence by misrepresenting the nature of
the victim's wishes. Rather, the prosecutor represented that, at the time he spoke
with the victim, she was not seeking prison time. There is no evidence that these
~

representations were contrary to what the prosecutor knew to be true." (Ruling and
Order, p. 2)(R. 340).
To the contrary, the telephone conversation with the complainant clearly
indicates that since the incident occurred complainant always desired a prison
incarceration for the defendant. The failure of the lower court to resolve this
conflict of testimony requires a remand or an evidentiary hearing.
This Court in State v. Humphrey, 79 P.3d 960 (Utah App. 2003) held that
once a defendant shows good cause by putting forth evidence that the plea was in
fact involuntary, the court needs to assess the credibility of the evidence and make

v,

detailed findings on all relevant facts pursuant to Rule 12 (c) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the trial court's findings must be sufficiently
detailed to allow the Appellate court the opportunity to adequately review the trial
court's decision. See, State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App. 1990).
In the instant case, Defendant presented undisputed evidence as to what Mr.
May had told the defense team and the defendant concerning the state of mind of
the complainant. But more importantly, the complainant herself completely
contradicted the statements made by Mr. May to the trial court during the guilty
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plea proceeding. Either the court should have resolved the obvious conflict
between these two sources of information or should have required an evidentiary
hearing in which the complainant could testify in court as to the exact
circumstances surrounding her interaction with Mr. May.
The prior case of this court requires a remand for additional findings or for
an evidentiary hearing to resolve the conflict.
POINT II
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEPUTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN MISREPRESENTING THE
DESIRES OF THE COMPLAINANT VIOLATED
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND CAUSED
HIM TO FOREGO HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.
The Utah Supreme Court in Utah v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1 (Utah 1993) enunciated
the duty of a prosecutor to provide information to the defense. The Court stated:
The prosecution's responsibility is that of a "minister of justice and
not simply that of an advocate" which includes a duty "to see that the
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the
basis of sufficient evidence." A criminal trial is more than a contest between
the prosecution and the defense; it is a search for the truth.
In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) Justice Sutherland explained
prosecutorial misconduct to mean "overstepping the bounds of that propriety and
fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the prosecution
of a criminal offense." The prosecution's affirmative duty to disclose evidence
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favorable to a defendant can trace its origins to early 20 th century strictures against
misrepresentation by prosecutors. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995).
In the instant case, the Deputy District Attorney Mr. May either intentionally
lJP

misrepresented the desires of the complainant as to punishment for the defendant
or was grossly negligent in failing to ascertain her real feelings. This
misrepresentation caused the defendant to waive his right to a preliminary hearing
because he did not want to alienate what seemed to be a forgiving complainant. As
such, therefore, he gave up his constitutional right to cross-examine the
complainant and to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the preliminary
hearing.
"The prosecutor has a special duty not to mislead; the government should, of
course, never make affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the

~

truth." United States v. Universita, 298 F .2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961 ). The government
cannot properly, either explicitly or implicitly mischaracterize information that it
has. A prosecutor cannot make knowing use of false evidence by misrepresenting
the nature of non-testimonial evidence. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967).
The continued misrepresentation of the desires of the complainant induced
Defendant to later give up his right to a jury trial and to enter a plea based on the
false assumption that the complainant would be favorable to him by not seeking a
prison term. This positive attitude would be reflected in the App report, the
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recommendation of the prosecutor, and any testimony before the sentencing court.
"When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, the Supreme Court
has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly
infringes upon them. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).

It is well settled that the "Brady Doctrine" provides that suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The prosecution's violation of Brady can render a
defendant's guilty plea involuntary. United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491,496
(10 th Cir. 1994). "In the context of an attack on the validity of a plea, evidence is
considered material where there is a reasonable probability but for the failure to
produce such information the defendant would not have entered the plea but
instead would have insisted on going to trial." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d
249 (2d Cir. 1998). This same principle is Applicable here.
In the instant case the prosecutor made several representations to induce the
defendant to give up his right to a jury trial. First, the chargeable offense was
reduced from a first degree offense to a second degree offense; second, the
prosecutor agreed to recommend no prison time provided the complainant did not
"affirmatively insist on the prosecution seeking a prison commitment"; third, the
prosecutor affirmatively stated that the complainant did not desire Defendant to
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serve a prison sentence and that her wishes were in compliance with the plea
agreement.
As stated in the filed Affidavits, this plea agreement was acceptable because,
v;

by reducing the offense from a first to a second degree, it gave the defendant the
opportunity to eliminate any prison sentence. However, this could only occur if
the complainant was cooperative and did not demand prison incarceration pursuant
to the victim rights statutes. The defense attorneys knew that if this occurred, the
defendant would have a high probability of probation (with county jail time
required) because a non-vindictive complainant would significantly influence the
App report, the recommendation of the prosecutor, and the sentencing court.
As evidenced by the Affidavits, if the prosecutor merely offered to reduce
the charge from a first to a second, the defense team would not have accepted it.

~

While the range of years is certainly much greater for a first than a second, the
estimated time used by the Board of Pardons for this particular offense would be
Approximately the same under either charge. It was only the inducement of
knowing that the complainant did not seek prison time that caused the defendant to
give up his constitutional rights including a trial by jury.
The lower court in one paragraph rejected Defendant's claim of
prosecutorial misconduct with the following statement:
Based on the record, the court cannot conclude that the prosecutor
made "affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the truth."
25
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United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961). Nor has the
prosecutor intentionally made knowing use of false evidence by
misrepresenting the nature of the victim's wishes. Rather, the prosecutor
represented that, at the time he spoke with the victim, she was not seeking
prison time. There is no evidence that these representations were contrary to
what the prosecutor knew to be true. (Ruling and Order, p. 2)(R.
340)( emphasis added).
The court obviously did not consider the telephone interview of the
complainant in which she clearly stated at least three times that she always wanted
the defendant to go to the state prison. Thus, it is hard to understand how the lower
court concluded that there was "no evidence" that the representations adamantly
made by the prosecutor were not "contrary to what the prosecutor knew to be true."
It is also difficult to imagine how the prosecutor could have misinterpreted

the very vindictive attitude of the complainant on the day of the preliminary
hearing. Perhaps it is a mere coincidence, that his very upbeat assessment of the
complainant's attitude eliminated the defense from the preliminary hearing and the
cross examination of the complainant and her girlfriend. The state produced no
evidence relating to the testimony of Deputy District Attorney Thaddeus May or
anyone else, for that matter, as to the circumstances of the preliminary hearing
interaction with the complainant and with the defense and defendant. The lower
court failed to address the issue of the preliminary hearing as to the prosecutorial
misconduct and only addressed the guilty plea.
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However, the misstatement or misrepresentation by the prosecutor
eliminated a valuable and constitutional right to confront defendant's accusers
completely apart and aside from his inducement to enter a guilty plea. Assuming
~

that the complaining witness was truthful in her statement to Mr. Kane, and
assuming that all of the decision making stated in the affidavits of Mr. Long and
the defendant occurred because of the prosecutor's misrepresentation, then it is
clear as a matter of law that this conduct directly caused the defendant to waive his
right to a preliminary hearing.
The prosecutorial misconduct by the prosecutor in misrepresenting and
misleading the defendant deprived him of due process. Therefore, under
constitutional law defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea, for a
reinstatement of the preliminary hearing, and a reinstatement of all the motions and

~

other matters that were pending prior to the entry of the guilty plea. This ruling
will allow the defendant to be restored to his position and to allow him to prepare
for trial by jury. Utah v. Gentry, 797 P.2d 456 ( 1990).
POINT III
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA UNDER SECTION 77-l 3-6(2)(A) U.C.A. SINCE
THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PLEA WAS NOT
KNOWINGLY OR VOLUNTARILY MADE.
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Section 77-13-6 U.C.A. states: "A plea of guilty or no contest may be
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly
and voluntarily made." Defendant maintains that under the circumstances of this
case his guilty plea was not "voluntary" under controlling case law.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988)
extensively dealt with the "voluntariness of a plea." The Court cited a U.S.
Supreme Court case that stated:
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to them
by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by
threat (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation,
including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises, or perhaps by promises that
are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor's business (e.g. bribe). Brady v. United States, 397, 742 (1970).
(Emphasis added).
The Court then cited a federal Fourth Circuit case in which the defendant
was told he could receive a prison sentence of 90 years--- when in fact the
maximum sentence was 55 years. Defendant pleaded guilty so as to receive no
more than a 25-year sentence. The 4th Circuit "held this misinformation vitiated
the voluntariness of the plea because the benefit of the defendant's bargain had
been grossly exaggerated. The defendant was therefore not aware of the true value
ofthe state's agreement." Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4 th Cir. 1975),
765 P.2d at 1278.
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In Copeland, the defendant was promised by the prosecutor to be placed in a
sex offender program at the Utah State Hospital rather than prison incarceration.
Based upon that representation defendant pied guilty. However, the sentencing
judge had no power at that time to commit him to the hospital rather than the
prison. The Court concluded that the promise was illusory and permitted the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
In State v. Norris, 57 P.3d 238 (Utah App. 2002) the trial court and the
prosecutor promised the defendant that he could pursue a claim for vindictive
prosecution on Appeal, but neither the court nor the prosecutor could fulfill that
promise since the trial judge never entered a final order disposing of the
defendant's vindictive prosecution claim and thus it could not be raised on Appeal.
The Court of Appeals held that because the defendant's "pleas were not made
Vii

voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty, the
defendant must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea." 57 P.3d at 240.
The lower court in its decision in the instant case cited the Copeland case
and acknowledged that misrepresentations, unfulfilled, or unfulfillable promises,
can make a plea involuntary. The court stated, however:
Based on the record, the court cannot characterize the prosecutor's
statements as misrepresentations, unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises. All
the statements on the record made by the prosecution were some version of
an explanation that the victim initially did not Appear to want the defendant
to go to prison, but the prosecution's recommendation remained consistently
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contingent on whatever the victim wanted. (Rule and Order, p. 23)( emphasis added).
This statement, of course, like the prior factual statements of the court
relating to prosecutorial misconduct, completely ignores the telephone transcript of
the complainant in which she stated that she always believed the defendant should
go to prison.
Finally, the court noted that the defendant was aware that the court was not
bound by the recommendations made by the prosecution and therefore, the plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made. (Ruling and Order, p. 3)(R. 241 ).
The negotiations in a plea bargain are a high stake's game of chance.
For example, if a person goes into a casino and sees a roulette wheel with 95 black
numbers and 5 red numbers, the person would feel quite confident on betting on
black even though there was still a small chance that red may be the winning
number. If the person bets on black and the wheel spins to red, the player can only
lament his bad luck. However, this same person would be entitled to take back his
bet if it was proven that the casino used trick lighting which completely distorted
the colors: whereas the true odds were 95 red and 5 black. Thus, the mere
possibility of an unfavorable result does not allow either a casino or a prosecutor to
distort the factors used in the decision making process.
The initial misrepresentation caused Defendant to waive his right to a
preliminary hearing that was critical to his defense. Later, in exchange for
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Defendant waiving his right to trial by jury, the prosecutor agreed to reduce the
charge by one degree. The handwritten statement under the category "Plea
Agreement" added an additional incentive: "In exchange for the defendant's plea
of guilty the prosecution agrees that in the event the victim does not affirmatively
insist upon the prosecution seeking a prison commitment then the prosecution will
recommend probation and no prison."
At the time the plea agreement was entered into, the prosecutor had
misrepresented that the complainant did not want Defendant to serve a prison
sentence. It was therefore presumed by Defendant and his counsel that only in the
unlikely event that complainant changed her mind, would the prosecution not
recommend probation and no prison term. In fact, however, the condition was
completely meaningless since the complainant at that very moment in time was
insisting upon prison for the defendant. The plea agreement, therefore, was
illusionary and while defendant and his counsel believed there was a high
probability that the prosecutor would honor this promise, in fact, there was next to
no probability based upon the complainant's strong desire to punish Defendant by
prison incarceration at the instant the document was signed.
In addition, the prosecutor's misrepresentation of the complainant's desires
not only affected the recommendations of the prosecutor but would also affect the
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AP&P report and the trial court when the complainant spoke so forcefully on
March 2, 2015 demanding that Defendant be sent to prison.
These repeated misrepresentations throughout the course of the prosecution
created a false belief that probation was achievable if the defendant agreed to give
up his right to a jury trial and plead guilty to the second-degree offense. Once
again, this belief was also illusionary since the ship had already sailed, the bell had
already rung, and the email had already been sent---dooming the probability of
probation while at the same time eliminating Defendant's constitutional rights
under our jury trial system.
Of course, it is impossible to know what caused the deputy district attorney
to so grossly misrepresent the attitude and state of mind of the complainant. In the
most extreme case, it could be assumed that the deputy district attorney wanted to
induce a plea bargain and avoid a trial by making a promise that would be very
attractive to the defendant but which he knew would never be fulfilled. He would
never have to make a recommendation against incarceration, knowing full well that
the complainant would not agree to such a sentence. The range of possible reasons
for this misrepresentation, therefore, goes from the extreme scenario just described
to simple carelessness or negligence in confusing the complainant with someone
else or simply forgetting what had previously occurred. In any event, however,
regardless of the motivation or reasons for the conduct of the deputy district
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attorney, the effect upon the defendant and his waiver of his right to trial was the
same.
The decision of the lower court must be reversed since the court failed to
~

consider the direct contradiction between the statements made by the deputy
district attorney in court and the statements of the complainant in the taped
interview. The failure to recognize this conflict made the decision of the court
fatally flawed since her legal conclusion was based upon erroneous facts. Because
the state failed to meet its obligation to produce any counter evidence, this Court
should assume the facts as stated by defendant are true and base its legal
conclusions upon such finding which must necessarily allow for the vacation of the
plea pursuant to Utah law.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons extensively outlined in the above arguments, Defendant
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the lower court and allow him to
vacate his guilty plea, conduct a preliminary hearing, and refile all prior motions
and requests made prior to the entry of a guilty plea.
DATED this 26 th day of October, 2015.

M-kv
Attorney for Appellant
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FILED DISTRICT COUBT
Third Judicial District

MAY O6 2015
By:

Salt Lake County

A"'j
I

---------Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND ORDER
Case No. 131903746

vs.
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS,

Judge Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills

Defendant.

Before the Court is Defendant's Amended Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea,
Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests ("Motion").
The Court has reviewed the moving, opposition, and reply papers. A hearing was held on April
27, 2015. Having considered the briefing and arguments of counsel, the Court now rules as
follows.
On April 12, 2012, Defendant was charged with Rape, a first degree felony. On January
5, 2015, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second degree
felony. With the advice of counsel, Defendant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel ("Statement") confinning that his plea was voluntary.
That Statement was also signed by his counsel confirming that the Defendant had read or was
read and understood the contents of that Statement and that the confirmations by the Defendant
in the Statement were true. The bottom of page four of the Statement reads as follows:
All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained
in this statement, including those explained below: In exchange for the Defendant's plea
of guilty the prosecution agrees that in the event the victim does not affirmatively insist
upon the prosecutor seeking a prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend
probation and no prison.
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Before signing the Statement, the prosecution had represented to the Defendant that, as of
the time of initial intake, the victim's impression was that she would not seek prison time.
Defendant was aware that the prosecution had not communicated with the victim since getting
her initial impression. At an evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2015, the prosecution explained
that the State's "recommendation is simply that we would honor the victim's wishes." On March
2, 2015, the victim appeared in court and, in part, made the following statement:
As far as what I believe should be dealt to you, I'm asking the Judge to sentence you twoand-a-half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt me. A prison I've been in,
waiting for this to be over. I also want you to be on the sexual offenders list.
Defendant contends that the prosecution made a material misrepresentation when it stated
that the victim did not want Defendant to go to prison. According to Defendant, this material
misrepresentation, which allegedly induced Defendant to accept the guilty plea, amounted to
prosecutorial misconduct which violated the Defendant's due process rights and caused him to
forego his right to a jury trial. The Court disagrees. Based on the record, the Court cannot
conclude that the prosecutor made "affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the
truth." United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961). Nor has the prosecutor
intentionally made knowing use of false evidence by misrepresenting the nature of the victim's
wishes. Rather, the prosecutor represented that, at the time he spoke with the victim, she was not
seeking prison time. There is no evidence that these representations were contrary to what the
prosecutor knew to be true.
Next, Defendant contends that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code
Ann. § 77-l 3-6(2)(A) because the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court respectfully
disagrees. Contemplating voluntariness, the Utah Supreme Court recognized:
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to
the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).

Slate v. Copeland, 765 P .2d 1266, 1274 (Utah I 988). Based on the record, the Court cannot
characterize the prosecutor's statements as misrepresentations, unfulfilled, or unfulfillable
promises. All of the statements on the record made by the prosecution were some version of an

2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00340

explanation that the victim initially did not appear to want the Defendant to go to prison, but the
· prosecution's recommendation remained consistently contingent on whatever the victim wanted.
Importantly, Counsel for the Defendant, after the Court found that the Defendant knowingly and
voluntarily entered into the plea, further represented to the Court that his client knew that the
Court was not bound by the recommendation made by the prosecution.
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has explained:
In order to assist courts in determining whether a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made,
we created rule 11. Rule 11 highlights important rights that defendants must understand
in order for their pleas to be valid. By addressing those rights with the defendant in the
plea hearing, district courts can test the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea and
create a record of their inquiry. Indeed, where a district court complies with all the
provisions of rule I 1, the court forecloses many potential arguments that the defendant's
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made.

State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ~ 24,279 P.3d 371,378. Here, there are no allegations that Rule
11 was violated. The Court is satisfied that there was compliance with Rule and that Defendant
knowingly and voluntarily entered into a guilty plea, particularly where "both the plea colloquy
and the plea agreement, which was incorporated into the plea hearing record, clearly set forth the
charges and the alleged conduct by (Defendant] that corresponded with the elements of the
charges, in compliance with rule 11." State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55, ~ 18, 309 P.3d 230.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Amended Motion
for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed
Motions and Requests is DENIED, consistent with the Court's Ruling above. The Court
anticipates sentencing the Defendant at the date previously set, May 11, 2015.
This Ruling and Order is the order of the Court, and no additional order is required to be
prepared in this matter
• •• ' ·., ...!... ..

DATED this~ day of May, 2015.
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CRAIG S. COOT( Bar No. 713
CRATG S. COOK, PC
3645 East Cascade Way
Salt Lake City., Utah 84109
Phone: (801) 485-8123

E-mai I: kiskaa(a),att.net

Attornev for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
--·· ~--··--- = = = =
vj

STATE OF UTAH~
AFFIDAVIT OF
SHA\VNKANE

Plaintift~

vs.

Case No. 131903 746

ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS~

Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF.

)

Olt\l ~?- s;-

Reing duly sworn under penalty of law, the declarant hereby declares and
states the following:

1.

I am over 18 years of age and can attest to the veracity of the
statc1nents made herein.
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2.

I am the owner of Kane Consulting, Inc. which is a licensed private
investigation service Jocated in \Vest Bountiful, Utah. J am a
mernber of the following organizations: ASIS~ PACSCO,
lJACDL, NCISS, and PJAU. I vvas chairman of the DPS PI
hearing and licensure board from 2008 to 2014.

2. I wa~ retained by attorney Lan-y Long to assist him concerning the rape
charges made against his client Robe11 Morgan i\llagness.

3. On Friday~ January 10, 2014 l contacted the alleged victim by te]ephone

using the phone number that was contained in the police and comt records.
4. I explained that I ,vas an investigator for the defense and requested that
she provide me infonnation as to what occmTed on the night of the charged crime.
She gave me a detailed description of her version of the events including her
emrloyment at the Good Spirits Bar that led to her meeting of Defendant, a regular
customer, as well as his son Shawn. She described how after her shift ended, she

and her girlfriend together with Shawn and another male went to the residence of
Defendant in order to drink and pa1iy.
5. She described the events that night and the following moming when
Defendant allegedly sexua11y assaulted her while she \Vas sleeping in the basement
area. She further described her reaction and her interaction with the police on that

morning.
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~

6. She inf01111ed me that in her mind the defendant had already entered a
~

guilty plea based upon her conversations with the prosecutor at the hearing she last

alt.ended. She stated that the prosecutor told her that she would not need to testify
VP

unless she wanted to go to the defendant's sentencing hearing to say something

about how he should be punished.
7. I advised her at several times in the conversation that she should contact
the prosecutor to clarify the status of the case.
8. l did not have any further contact with the alleged victim until March 1,
2015. I was asked by attorney Lan-y Long to try to contact her, once again, in

order to clarify the time frante as to when she first ]et it be known that she ,vanted
the defendant 1~0 serve time in prison. I contacted her on the same phone number

that I had previously used in my January 2014 call.
9. I recorded the conversation \Vith the alleged victim so that a complete and

accurate record could be made. I have reviewed the transcript dated March 26,
~

2015 of this telephone call and believe that it accurately reflects the conversation

that I had with the alleged victim on TvJarch 1, 201 5. This transcript is attached to
this affidavit.
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lJnder p<malty of perjury under the laws of the State of t.Hah, I, Shawn Kane
hereby swear that the fr>regoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and

under5tandi ng.

....

-~

---•-·~-----•--·•···-'

-· Shawn Kane.

••

-

&

·-

•

~f-

SlJBSCRJBED AND SWORN to hefore me on this

10:~.'. day of ApriL

..

' ,
-~- 't --.:~/- .

,-~·- .· ~- :_..; 4l{~ ·.

.

,.,
·-

-)·

.•.
; !.

.·,.L£; _·__ •.. n - -

Notarv.,, Public
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1

I~ THE THIRD .JlJDIClAL DISTRJCT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COlJ1'TY, STATE OF llTAH

--------------------,----------------STATE OF CTAH~

Plaintiff,

CASE l\o. 131903746

TRANSCRIPTTON OF MARCH 15T.2015
TELEPl-lO\;E INTERVIEW

vs.
.JLDGE: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-f\-111.LS
ROBERT MORGAN ~1AGNESS,

Defendant.

COl\·1ES NO\V, the Defendant and offers this transcription taken from the recording of a
telephone interview between Shawn Kane. a private investigator, and .\1. C .. the victim in this
case. which tr,ok place on March 1'\ 2015. This Transcription ,vas prepared by Aaron A.
Crabtree, law clerk for I .arry Long.
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PROCEEDINGS

1
vJ

~

2

rvtR. KAI\F:

3

fv1el issa. can you hear me OK?

4

:vf. C.:

s

Yeah, I can hear you.

6

vrn. KA'.'JE:

7

Ok. Thank you for c.:all ing me back. l appreciate it. Again-

8

f\1. C.:

9

I was-

10

~-1R. KANE:

11

Oh. go ahead.

12

M. C.:

13

1just wanted to clarify. ~o you are working on behalf of Robe11, right?

14

\.1R. KANE:

15

Correct. Sn, I'm a licensed private investigator here in the state of Ltah. I work-

16

M. C.:

17

Wait, why would 1 want to talk to you?

18

\1R. KANE:

19

Oh, no, underst~ndab}e. ( work for attorney Larry Long. You and 1 actually spoke tvv·o years ago.

20

M. C.:

21

Yes. I'm actually upset cJbt)Ut that because I ,,vas a little bit c.onfuscd a" to like who I \,vas talking

22

with.

23

MR. K/\KF:
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Oh~ sorry, sorry. 1 try and explain up front: and sometimes people aren · t- don't completely
2

understand, so. · cause again [ have to be transparent~ and so you don :t have to talk to me. I'm

3

1101-

4

attorney asked me to ask you a question about, you had talked to that adult probation & parole

5

officer.

6

\1. C.:

7

Yes.

8

:v1R. KANE:

9

Hold that thought. I forgot her nan1e. Jennifer.

you know~ l can:t force you to talk to me= anything like Lhat. You don't have to. I just- the

C.:

10

;\-1.

11

Yeah.

12

MR. KM\F.:

13

And there \:\!as n question. Jennifer Murray a~ked you a question~ and then the attorney had a

14

question. [ say ~-the attorney/: sort)\ Larry Long hHd a question about prison. And so! initially~

15

and I'll explain kind of the question and then- initially~ when Lhis whole thing started and you

16

had spoken with lhe district attorney and the prosecutor - that vvould he Thad May·- at a hearing

17

they believe you said that you did not want Rohe1i to go to prison.

18

ivl. C.:

19

1\·o. I didn't sa~: that.

20

\1R. K/\~F:

21

Ok.

22

i\l C.:

•
~

(!;

23

I didn't say tha1 I did not want him to go lo prison. I said, ~'Well. ifs more important to me thal
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he~ s on the sexual offenders 1isl.'' That was like- l said that I wanted him

~

~

'...:P

LO

serve prison lime.

2

but the most important thing to me was that [ wanted him to go on the sexmll offenders list.

3

MR. KAKE:

I.I

Ok. So you- just to clarify. so J know. you do want him on the sexual offenders list.

5

\11. C.:

6

Yes.

7

ivfR. KANE:

8

.'\ncL at the time. did you want, when you talked tn him~ did you want him to gn to prison loo?

9

!'V1. C.:

10

Yes. r felt like he deserved some time in prison.

11

rvtR. KANE:

12

Ok. i\lright. And that- I just wanted to double check, ·cause there was some confusion from the

l3

attorneys• side. and not your attorneys but Larry Long and the paperwork that cmnc in, in

14

making sure that he had the com:cl information, that when you talked to the- talked to Thad

15

\fay-

16

M. C.:

17

Yc.:ah.

18

MR. KAKE:

19

Did you say ynu \\:anted Robert lo go to prison? And then. when you talked to .Jennifer \4urphy.

20

did you also tell her you wanted him to go to prison too?

21

~t C.:

22

Yes. I said the- I said essential)~. the same thing to her.

7.3

1

'vfR. KANE:
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J

Ok. Ok, and thal ·s al] l was trying lo clarify. I do appreciate you. you know~ at least talking to

2

me and letting me kl1(HV on that. And so, that- that was just truly it. They wanted clarification on

3

that Just Io- ro double check and clarify if you wanted him lo go to prison and also be on the

4

sexual offenders registry.

5

M.C.:

6

I'm planning on going there tomorrow. and maybe y<.Hl could help me with a question. Docs it

7

stru1 al 9A.M?

8

MR. K/\l\E:

9

J

~

believe it d()es. ves. At the- as far as f kno\V it does start at 9/\M. ves.

10

vt. C.:

11

Ok.

12

rv1R. KANE:

,I

,

~

~

~

rd probably get there maybe about 8;30~ 8:45. You

13

YeHh. So. If you are planning on attending~

1.4

know, if you are planning on attending. That way, you can~ for you.

15

M.C.:

16

\VeJI basically I just

17

f\.;fR. KAKE:

18

Ok. ·cause, it might- it might start directly at 9 o'clock, but ifs planned to. And so.

19

M. C'.:

20

Ok.

21

rvlR. KANE:

.7.7.

Yeah. Ok, well thank you. and r do appreciate you calling me hack.

23

fV1. C.:

\Vant

to say what l have to say and then leave. You know.
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@

1

Ok. No problem.

2

MR. KANE:

3

Buh-bye.

4

M.C.:

5

Bye.

@

6
@

END OF RECORDING

7
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TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE

1

2
3

STATEOFUTAH

)

4

)

s

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

6

I, Aaron Crabtree, clerk for Larry Long, do hereby Certify:

s

That this transcription is an accurate representation of a telephone

9

10

interview which took place between Shawn Kane, a private investigator, and M. C., the victim of
this case, on M~.rch P\ 2015.

11

12

WITNESS MY HAND this 26th day of March, 2015

13

RABTREE, CLERK

14

1S

Residing in Salt Lake County

16
17
18

19
20

21
22
23
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